Changelog

What's changed

All notable changes to Silt are recorded here. The format follows Keep a Changelog, and the project aims to follow Semantic Versioning.

This log is published at silthq.com/changelog.

Unreleased

Nothing has shipped yet — Silt has not cut its first tagged release. Everything below will land as 0.1.0, the first public release. When it's tagged, this section becomes the dated 0.1.0 entry and the download links resolve to real binaries.

Added

• Content-addressed storage — every fragment is named by the SHA-256 of its bytes; verification is intrinsic, so hosts are never trusted.
• Erasure coding — Reed-Solomon stripes (default any 10 of 16 rebuild the file); a repair loop restores redundancy as machines fail, and — like the initial placement — keeps each stripe's shards spread across distinct hosts as it rebuilds, so one machine's death never costs a stripe more than a single shard.
• Encryption at every level — chunks and manifests are both ciphertext; a file's share handle is a link (silt:v1:root:key) whose one-way key hierarchy also yields care links that grant repair and audit without the ability to decrypt.
• The swarm — Kademlia routing, provider records, and multi-node fetch over a deterministic simulator or real mutual-TLS sockets; identity is a keypair and a node's ID is the hash of its public key.
• Capacity — nodes pledge a fixed budget (-capacity 2G); placement spills over as nodes fill, and every node estimates the whole network's size from local gossip alone.
• Proof-of-retrieval audits — hosts are challenged to prove possession with a fresh nonce; those that keep the proof but drop the data are slashed.
• The registry chain — an append-only chain kept by the operators; blocks commit only with a quorum of attestations from validators whose reputation (audits + serving) is earned, not bought.
• Genesis — every fresh network is born carrying a founding manifesto in block 0, declared identically on every node.
• Takedown by revocation — illegal or unwanted content is removed at the availability layer, not the ledger: an append-only revocation record, committed by the same reputation quorum, makes compliant nodes no-op on a denied opaque root (refusing to store, serve, prove, announce, or repair it) and purge what they hold — never decrypting anything. Operators may also load a local denylist they choose to honor (silt daemon -denylist). The project ships the mechanism and no list; it operates neither the network nor the policy.
• Web UI — an embedded dashboard, publish/fetch pages, and a network observatory, served by the daemon.
• Desktop client — one binary that consumes and serves at once, keeps a link-book library, and runs on macOS, Windows, and Linux.
• Public website (silthq.com) with brand, docs, operator guide, and build-from-source instructions.
• Continuous delivery — PR previews, a staging environment, and production deploys from main; a public changelog rendered from this file.
• Governance & strategy docs — the fresh-eyes council, risk register, launch plan, safety/takedown model, and GOVERNANCE.md.

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